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Abstract: In comparison with established democracies Nigeria is a highly populated and ethnic 
fragmented state. Therefore after colonial rule and independence a federal constitutional 
structure was supposed to bring the processes for conflict resolution between the ethnic groups. 
In 1960 Nigeria started as a highly decentralised state and went through important changes until 
1999 towards greater centralisation which found its culmination in regular military governments 
and open conflicts. Until 1999 each constitution promulgated by the military was considered as 
a step towards the transition to democracy. After the constitution making process, political 
actors aspired to constitutional reforms in a democratic way. Those attempts at mega 
constitutional change were not successful, which lead to military coups once again. This paper 
traces back mega-constitutional change in Nigeria between 1999 until 2007. After a brief 
introduction the paper proceeds with the foundations of federalism and constitution making in 
Nigeria. The following three paragraphs deal with the politics of constitutional change in Nigeria 
from 1999 until 2007. The final part of the paper compares the failure of Nigerian constitutional 
reforms with the case of Canada. As in the Canadian case, sub constitutional change in Nigeria 
is presented as a possible answer to demands of reform, instead of mega-constitutional reform. 
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Introduction 
Nigeria has a population of over 140 million. Its diversity is enormous. There are over 
374 ethno-lingual groups (Otitie 1990) each with its distinguishing culture and tradition. 
The political culture of Nigerians is highly influenced by their ethnic, religious and 
regional backgrounds and identities are constructed along similar lines.  
Federalism became an inevitable choice for Nigerians at the terminal period of 
colonial rule as a result of Nigeria’s diversity. It was adopted as a mechanism for 
managing conflicts that resulted from interactions among diverse groups in the country. 
Federalism remained a part of Nigeria’s political system since independence in 1960 
except for a brief period in 1966, when the military decreed a unitary system of 
government. Over the years, five constitutions were promulgated by military and civilian 
administrators. This resulted in significant changes in the federal structure, institutions 
and processes of Nigeria. The federation was transformed from a highly decentralized 
polity with three large component units at independence to a highly centralized one 
with 36 component units (states) and a Federal Capital Territory. There are also 774 
local governments in the federation.  
With the return to civilian rule in1999, there have been complaints about the nature 
of the federal arrangement as it shapes interactions among groups and governments. 
Some of these complaints are attributed to constitutional flaws or inadequacies. Some 
groups have been agitating for a constitutional review to address these issues. A 
number of attempts were made in the past eight years. Unfortunately none of the 
attempts were successful. Another attempt is presently being made by the National 
Assembly. This paper provides a brief history of constitution making in Nigeria, 
highlights relevant issues considered for review and discusses the politics of 
constitutional change before drawing some prescriptive considerations. 
1.1 Federalism and constitution-making in Nigeria 
Federalism, according to Watts (1994: 7) is “not an abstract ideological model to which 
political society is to be brought into conformity, but rather a way or process of bringing 
people together through practical arrangements intended to meet both common and 
diverse preferences of people.” This is essentially in line with Friedrich’s (1964: 1) 
assertion that “federalism is a process rather than a design.” It is “primarily the process 
of federalizing a political community” (Friedrich 1964: 7). That is to say, “the process by 
which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for working 
out solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint decisions on joint problems, and 
conversely also the process by which a unitary political community becomes 
differentiated into federally engaged whole.” Federalism is therefore generally seen as 
a technique, mechanism or practical method of solving practical problems. This 
explains why there is no ideal form or model of federal system.  
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Two broad perspectives can be identified in conceptualizing federalism: the 
sociological and constitutional/legal perspectives (Brooks 1994: 136). On the one hand, 
the sociological viewpoint sees federalism as an institutionalized political cooperation 
and collective coexistence that emanates from the desire of a people to form a union 
without necessarily losing their identity. In essence, this perspective views federalism 
as a function of society—a product of the interaction of socio-cultural and political 
factors. Thus, the essence of federalism, argues Livingston (1956: 1-2), lies in the 
society and not the institutional or constitutional structure. On the other hand, the 
legal/constitutional viewpoint conceptualizes federalism as a form of governmental 
structure an institutionalized framework of power sharing that provides the framework 
for interaction among governments. It also protects rights of citizens and minorities. 
Federalism is therefore viewed as a property of the constitution (Brooks 1994: 136). 
Blindenbacher and Watts (2003: 12) noted, however, “Federal systems are a function 
of not only constitutions, but also of governments, and fundamentally of societies”. The 
constitution thus becomes an essential requirement of federal governance such that it 
“can be symbolically important in fostering unity or discord within the country” 
(Anderson 2008: 55). 
Since the terminal period of colonial rule Nigeria has adopted federal constitutions 
as a way of institutionalizing the principles of ‘shared rule’ and ‘self-rule.’ Significant 
changes in federal structure, institutions and processes were made but these basic 
principles have remained intact. However, the incursion of military into the political 
affairs of the country for nearly 30 years has negatively impacted the constitution-
making process and therefore the various constitutions established. Of the five 
constitutions established since independence in 1960, three, including the present 
constitution, were promulgated by the military.  
1.2 Nigeria’s constitution making history: from colonial to military rule 
Between the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern British Protectorates in 1914 
and independence, four constitutions were established by different colonial 
administrations. These were the Clifford Constitution of 1922, Richards Constitution of 
1946, Macpherson Constitution of 1951 and the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954. The 
1954 Constitution laid the foundation for Nigerian federalism. From independence in 
1960 to date Nigeria has been governed by five different constitutions. The 
Independence Constitution ushered in a new democratic government after almost five 
decades of colonial rule from 1914 to 1960. In 1963, the Republican Constitution was 
adopted to principally end political attachment to the England as a former British 
colony.  
Having obtained formal independence in 1960, the nascent Nigerian state 
continued in its search for a reliable guideline that would reflect the aspiration of its 
newly independent people. Thus constitutional conferences were held both in London 
and Lagos as was the case in 1957 and 1958 respectively, for the purpose of ushering 
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in the Independence Constitution of 1960. Unfortunately, instead of the Independence 
Constitution marking a total departure from the imposing Lyttleton Constitution, the 
constitution remained fundamentally colonial.  
The political reality was that despite formal independence the Nigerian state was 
still being colonized by Britain, with the Queen of England serving as Nigeria's 
constitutional monarch and the final Court of Appeal for Nigeria remaining as the 
Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council. The situation implied that Nigeria was 
not really independent as being presented. Hence, despite the formal independence, 
Nigeria remained perpetually subservient to the political dictates of the colonial Lords in 
London.  
Still struggling for viable rules and regulations to legally sustain the unconsolidated 
Nigerian polity, the leaders resolved that Nigeria should be a federal republic. 
Consequently, a constitutional conference was held in Lagos between July 25 and 26, 
1963. Thus provisions of the 1963 Republican Constitution removed the Queen of 
England as the Head of State of Nigeria. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
became the final Court of Appeal. On January 15, 1966, the military took over the 
government and consequently abolished the Republican Constitution. The First 
Republic after formal independence from 1960 lasted only six years and the military 
took over political power by force in 1966. The military ruled for thirteen years and 
handed over power in 1979. The Second Republic lasted only four years and the 
military took over again in 1983. The military ruled for another sixteen years and 
handed over power on May 29, 1999.  
The 1979, 1989 and present 1999 Constitutions were advanced by the military as 
part of their transition to civilian rule. In between these constitutions, extra-
constitutional laws and decrees were shaped and enforced by the military. The military 
also abolished the legislative arm of government and seized the function of law-
making. Consequently, federal governance became an exclusive precept of the military 
through military ‘legislative organs’ (Elaigwu 2007: 103).  
Superficially, the constitution-making process under the military was to be 
participatory especially as Constituent Assemblies (CAs) were inaugurated with 
members largely elected. Nevertheless, despite attempts at employing democratic 
procedures, the military’s undemocratic temperament in the management of 
constitution-making processes in Nigeria’s political history has affected the credibility of 
the process, and the perceived legitimacy of the constitutions.1 The precedent set in 
                                                
1  For example, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was put together by a 
25-member ‘Constitution Debate Collating Committee’ which was headed by Hon. Justice 
Niki Tobi of the Court of Appeal (as he then was). The Committee was set up by General 
Abdulsalam Abubakar regime in November 1998 solely to organise nationwide consultations 
on the 1995 draft Constitution. The Committee was given two months to complete its 
assignment, so it divided the country into zones, called for memoranda, organised debates, 
had special hearings and travelled to selected states, to listen to views from a wide range of 
groups. However, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) decree 
no. 24 of 1999 stated that the military leaders known as the Provisional Ruling Council 
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colonial Nigeria has severely affected the present democratic government in the 
management of the constitution-making process.  
3.1 Constitution review in Nigeria’s new democratic setting 
Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, the Nigerian political elites have made 
attempts to respond to the yearnings of groups and governments over the review of the 
constitution. On October 19, 1999 the former President, Olusegun Obasanjo set up a 
Presidential Technical Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution. The advisory 
committee worked for one year and five months, holding public sittings and examining 
submissions and memoranda before eventually turning in a report (1.) The report was 
presented at zonal centers between April 30 and May 29, 2000. The final report was 
then forwarded to the National Assembly for appropriate action. The National Assembly 
Joint Committee on Constitution Review (JCCR) set up in May 2000 failed to effect any 
change. The report of the committee was not transformed into a constitution because it 
was largely an advisory body. It was also alleged but never confirmed that the 
committee’ effort were frustrated by some officials in or loyal to the Presidency who had 
another plan for the alteration of the constitution.  
That alleged plan was to materialize in 2006 when the National Assembly JCCR 
under the leadership of the Deputy Senate President, Ibrahim Mantu recommended, 
among other amendments, the amendment of the Constitution to allow for the 
elongation of the tenure of the President and state governors beyond the 
constitutionally stipulated two consecutive terms of four years each. The proposed 
constitutional amendment was formally defeated on May 16, 2006 when the Senate 
voted against it, a decision that in effect undermined the other seemingly desirable 
clauses recommended for amendment. This dramatic decision by a National Assembly 
that was frequently referred to as the robber stamp of the president surprised many. 
However, as Joseph (2008) explained, more than formal rules, it was a combination of 
extensive civil society mobilization, “money politics” by administration foes, a timely 
media intervention, and Senator Nnamani’s (the senate president’s) courage that lay 
behind Nigeria’s big no to the “big man.“ 
Meanwhile, in 2005, the President Olusegun Obasanjo had convened a 400 
member delegates’ National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) charged with forging 
a national consensus on a new constitutional blueprint for ‘reinforcing the unity, 
cohesion, stability, security, progress, development and performance of the Nigerian 
federation’ (Obasanjo 2005: 72). After several months of deliberations, the NPRC 
ended in deadlock over demands by delegates from the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s oil-
producing region, for an increase in the derivation formula from the constitutionally 
stipulated 13% of “revenue accruing to the federation account directly from any natural 
                                                                                                                                          
(PRC) made “such amendments as were deemed necessary in the public interest and for the 
purpose of promoting the security, welfare and good governance of the people of Nigeria”. 
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resources” to 25% in the short term and 50% in the long term. This position, “25% 
derivation now and 50% ultimately”, was vehemently rejected by the delegates from the 
non-oil producing states, especially the North. The argument of the delegates from the 
North was that acceding to this demand in an economy that solely depends on oil will 
lead to bankruptcy for the region and the entire federation. Ultimately, the 17% 
“compromise” reached was rejected by the Niger Delta delegates. 
With the inauguration of a new civilian administration in 2007, another attempt was 
initiated by the National Assembly to review the 1999 Constitution by the National 
Assembly after the attempt that collapsed in 2006. Just like before, a Joint Committee 
of the National Assembly has been established to carry out this task.2 However, unlike 
the previous attempt, the committee’s scope was narrowed. An agenda was set for the 
committee. Fifteen areas are to be considered for review. These issues include: 
making fundamental obligation of government binding and actionable; Scope of right of 
citizens; Autonomy of the legislature; uniformity and harmonization of tenure of chief 
executives of local, state and federal governments; Immunity of chief executives; 
subsistence of state electoral commissions; autonomy and independence of federal 
electoral commission- the Independent electoral Commission; Local government 
autonomy as a third tier of government; Local government joint account; devolution of 
powers; revenue sharing; election and related matters; right of exploration of mineral 
resources; true federalism; and state creation.3 
4.1 Politics of constitutional change in the Nigerian federation and the difficulty of 
mega constitutional change 
Nigeria, like many other federal countries, has a rigid constitution. Amending the 
constitution requires securing two-thirds majority in the two houses of the National 
Assembly. In addition, amendment requires approval by resolution of sub-national 
legislatures of not less than two-thirds of all the 36 states in the federation. This rigidity 
is sterner on issues that have to do with restructuring of the federation and fundamental 
rights of citizens. Amending the Constitution for these purposes or amending the 
Section that stipulates the procedure of altering the Constitution requires the approval 
of four-fifths majority of all the members of the National Assembly and approval of not 
less than two-thirds majority in all sub-national legislatures of federation.  Securing 
                                                
2  The National Assembly Joint Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution (JCCR), 
which was inaugurated late 2008, is made up of 88 members, 44 from each of the chambers. 
In January 2009, the process of reviewing the 1999 Constitution by the National Assembly 
began on a sour note as the 44 members of the House of Representatives on the joint 
committee on the review of the 1999 Constitution staged a walk-out of the opening ceremony 
of a two-day retreat for the committee, over the controversy of who should be the chairman 
of the JCCR. The bone of the contention in the JCCR was over the designation for Deputy 
Speaker of the House in the committee. The Senate wants him to be ‘vice-chairman’ while 
the House members insist on him being ‘co-chairman.’ 
3  This Day (Lagos) 2008, October 12, p.1-7. 
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such majorities in the national and sub-national legislatures is quite a Herculean task 
given Nigeria’s divisive politics of federalism. Compounding this is the fact that the 
politics of constitutional change in Nigeria vis-à-vis federalism is characterized by 
competition for control of power and state resources. It is centered on balancing (or 
capitalizing on) regional advantages. This difficulty is poignantly demonstrated in the 
politics of state creation.  
Principally, structural imbalances in the Nigerian federation are viewed within the 
context of the colonial North and South. The structure of the federation at 
independence in 1960 comprised of 3 regions: two (later three) in the South and one in 
the North. The military fragmented the 4 big regions into 12 smaller states and equated 
the number of states between the North and South in 1967. The number has been 
unequal since 1976 when the military government increased the number of states from 
12 to 19. Presently, the number of states in the geopolitical North is 19 while that in the 
South is 17. There are clamors for additional states in virtually all the 36 states of the 
federation. In some cases, the number requested is more than one. It is to be noted 
that clamor for the creation of new states is motivated above all other factors by the 
centralized revenue allocation system and the automatic allocation of substantial 
revenues to states by a revenue formula that has to do more with equality of states and 
population rather than their revenue raising abilities (Suberu 2001). State creation 
therefore becomes largely an elite project to secure access to the “national cake.”  
However, the issue of creation of states is thorny in Nigeria’s federal politics. 
Attempts to create new states are usually seen as tinkering with the precarious 
structural ‘balance’ in the federation. Thus, it is objected or countered with similar 
agitations from other regions. The scramble for more states can consume the whole 
constitutional review exercise in a way the tenure elongation issue ridiculed the 2006 
attempt. Except in 1963 when the Midwest Region was created by a civilian 
government, all state creation exercises have been carried out by the military. Perhaps, 
this informed the frustration of a senator of the Federal Republic who recently declared 
that only the military can create new States.4 Another serving senator and member of 
the National Assembly Joint Committee on Constitutional Review (JCCR) expressed 
his fears. He laments: 
“I don’t see an easy ride on the issue of state creation in the proposed 
amendment […] Nobody should have it that state creation can be easily 
achieved in Nigeria in a democratic dispensation.” 5 
These views are seen by many as those apologetic to the military. However, they 
point to the fact that Nigeria’s constitution is rigid and hence difficult to amend.  The 
rigidity of federal constitutions is a way of ensuring that fissiparous tendencies in the 
federalizing process are reduced. In Nigeria, the civil war experience after a loose 
                                                
4  This frank public comment became a rallying point for the discourse on constitutional 
amendment. See Daily Sun (Lagos), 2009, January 10 for a perspective of the discourse. 
5  Daily Sun (Lagos), ibid. 
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federal arrangement before the first military coup in 1966 justifies the adoption of a rigid 
constitution that centralizes power. However, the present constitution was promulgated 
by the military. After nine years of democratic experience it is obvious that certain 
sections of the Constitution need to be amended. Yet there is no unanimity on how this 
constitutional reform should develop. Different perspectives have emerged on this. 
First, some Nigerians question the legitimacy of the Constitution. The Constitution, 
it is argued, was promulgated by the military and hence it is undemocratic and 
illegitimate (Ihonbvere 2003: 203). Thus, any initiative of government arising from the 
same document is seen as a charade. The solution therefore is the convocation of a 
Sovereign National Conference (SNC). This conference, as its proponents argue, will 
give Nigerians unfettered opportunity to discuss how to shape their future in one 
geopolitical entity. It is a “safety valve or forum for groups to air their frustrations about 
perceived imperfections of the Nigerian federal system” (Dare 2003: 110). However, as 
Suberu (2005: 5) argued, the “SNC model originally evolved in the 1990s in Benin and 
other French-speaking African countries as a strategy for effecting the displacement of 
dictatorial regimes by diverse coalitions within civil society.” Therefore the SNC is 
inappropriate for a country like Nigeria, where some formally democratic institutions 
already exist. Given the multilayered fluidity of ethnic boundaries in the country, 
proponents of the SNC have also failed to fashion generally acceptable guidelines for 
selecting delegates of ethnic groups and other groups to the conference. Finally, 
suggestions that the SNC would revisit the viability and modalities of Nigerian unity 
have often provoked suspicion and antipathy in a country where a million lives were 
lost in the 1967-70 civil war of national unity.  
This position seemed to be upheld in 2005, when a coalition of opposition and 
groups under the aegis of Pro- National Conference Organization (PRONACO) 
organized what they called a Sovereign National Conference (SNC). The group had 
earlier rejected the government sponsored National Political Reforms Conference 
(NPRC) in its entirety for what they described as its lack of its popular support and 
sovereign powers, and consequently organized an alternative conference with 
sovereign powers, and with deliberations covering all issues without imposing no-go 
areas. Yet the PRONACO conference was characterized by the same deep divisions, 
controversies and stalemate that characterized the NPRC. In addition, the draft 
“People’s Constitution” that finally emerged from this effort in 2006 has remained 
merely a draft yet to be transformed into any meaningful policy action.  
The National Assembly therefore remains the most viable avenue through which 
the Constitution can be changed. Yet this option, as indicated earlier, remains very 
difficult especially on issues that have to do with federalism.  
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5.1 Exploring other options: non-constitutional adaptations and incremental 
constitutional reform 
Russell (1994: 8) x-rayed the Canadian constitutional crisis and concluded that mega-
constitutional change is likely to be a very difficult process. This difficulty “will put 
pressure on informal methods of constitutional change and on devices for resolving 
constitutional disputes.” His conclusions suggest the importance of informal and non-
constitutional adaptations, as well as the importance of judicial adjudications in the 
federalization process. His comment aligns with Suberu (2005: 6) who concluded after 
an examination of the proposals advocated by different ethnic and political groups in 
the country for “renovating the architecture of Nigeria’s federalism” that: 
“short of a successful initiative by Nigeria’s current leaders to mobilize 
national consensus behind positive constitutional change, or a 
democratic breakdown that would lead to a fresh round of constitutional 
review under military auspices, the country’s best hope for political 
reform lies in working pragmatically but creatively through the current 
institutional framework to promote non-constitutional renewal.” 
1. Non-Constitutional Adaptations: As it has developed in the Canadian context, 
following two failed attempts during 1987-92 at mega-constitutional change, the idea of 
non-constitutional renewal assumes that a troubled federation ‘has the capacity to 
adapt to changing needs and evolving circumstances regardless of the difficulty in 
implementing constitutional amendments' (Lazar 1998: 3-4; cf. Suberu 2005: 6). 
Elements of this “strategy of pragmatic, piecemeal, non-constitutional renewal” in the 
country since the restoration of civilian rule in 1999 include: Judicial Activism reflected 
in the “judiciary’s work in trying to curb electoral malpractice” (Joseph 2008) and in “the 
bold, balanced, and broadly anti-centralist jurisprudence of the independent Supreme 
Court” in arbitrating a series of constitutional or federal-state disputes over revenue 
allocation, local government, anti-corruption legislation, urban planning, and party 
registration” (Suberu 2005: 7); the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2007 to 
enhance transparency and accountability in public finance;  the establishment of the 
Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI)- Nigeria’s subset of the 
global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI)- to increase transparency in 
the management of Nigeria’s oil, gas and mining sectors; and the regulation of  conflict 
in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic federal system through the geopolitical zoning arrangement 
(whereby the 36 states of the federation are informally divided into 6 zones) for 
distribution of resources and the sharing of political power. 
2. Incremental constitutional reform: Another approach worth pursuing is the issue 
of incremental constitutional reform. A crucial issue for such an enterprise is electoral 
reform. At the root of the governance problems that Nigeria faces today is the question 
of leadership. The leadership problem itself is fostered by the inability of the electoral 
system to give the citizens meaningful choices to elect their leaders under a free and 
fair environment. Elections in Nigeria have become a charade, what has been 
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characterized as “voting without choosing” (Ake 1996). The products of this “choiceless 
democracies” (Mkandawire 1999: 119-135) are rulers who are neither representative of 
the people nor accountable to them. Confronted by this phenomenon, the potential of 
democracy for managing power struggles among the elites, enforce rules effectively 
and manage institutions/political process efficiently and transparently, let alone serve 
as an avenue through which the material deprivation of the people are redressed, is 
whittled down or completely eroded. Importantly, given the deficit in democratisation, 
not only has federal processes and politics failed to tap fully from the mutually 
reinforcing benefit and opportunities between federalism and democracy which 
scholars such as Wheare (1964) alluded to decades ago, but in some respect each of 
the concepts (federalism and democracy) has dragged down the other in ways that are 
mutually destructive. Electoral reforms are therefore imperative if the country must 
make any progress on federal governance.  
Fortunately, there are steps in this direction. President Yar'Adua in a show of rare 
sincerity that is lacking in the political class in Nigeria wholeheartedly condemned the 
sham elections that brought him to power and undertook to set up an Electoral Reform 
Committee (ERC) that will make appropriate recommendations for the restoration of 
the sanctity of the ballot box. Consequently, the President in August 2007 announced 
the constitution of the ERC, which had, Justice Muhammed Lawal Uwais, retired Chief 
Justice of the Federation, as its chairman. The Committee submitted its report to the 
president in December 2008. The report contained far-reaching reforms such as 
denying the (partisan) Presidency control of the electoral commission and ensuring fair 
and timely resolution of disputes arising there from. To give concrete meaning to the 
reforms, the Committee recommended the passing of three bills. The first is the 1999 
Constitution amendment bill. The second is Electoral Act 2006 amendment bill and the 
third is Electoral Offences Commission bill. As Festus Okoye, former Chairman of the 
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) and a member of the ERC has noted, a pragmatic 
approach to escaping the constitutional amendment deadlock of the past is to 
concentrate on the electoral reform while leaving out the contentious issues of 
federalism which, if pursued, may likely end up rubbishing the whole exercise as it did 
in the past.  
Conclusion 
History shows that mega-constitutional politics only rarely succeed. This holds true as 
well for the reform of Nigerian federalism. Experience has shown that reform of 
constitutions and constitutional frameworks in deeply divided societies is no mean task. 
Lessons from failed constitutional settlements suggest that mega constitutional reforms 
with its inherent proclivity for expanding the agenda to include the demands of multiple 
groups, and opening the constitutional process to mass legitimisation through use of 
referenda can undermine political stability and the prospect of settlement. Canada's 
failed Charlottetown Accord (1992) poignantly reflected this. Nigeria’s experience from 
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1999 to 2007 has also buttressed this fact. But besides the “difficulties of attempting 
comprehensive rather than incremental constitutional restructuring where so many 
varied interests have to be reconciled at the same time in a process involving public 
participation” which contributed to Canada’s “three decades of periodic federal crises” 
(Watts 1996: 353), the challenge for constitutional reform is more daunting for Nigeria 
because as indicated earlier, Nigerian political elites hardly take the right approach to 
issues that require constitutional review. Rather the process has been characterized by 
political intrigues, overriding personal ambitions, manipulations and elite and or ‘big 
man’ capture that have scuttled the whole exercises. There is no reason to suggest 
that this problem has changed. Thus as promising as non-constitutional adaptations 
and incremental constitutional changes (beginning with electoral reforms that could 
give meaningful choices to citizens to choose their leaders and hence enhance their 
capacity to actively participate in government decisions-making that affects their lives) 
are, there is no reason to suggest that these will be smooth sailing. Yet it is a road 
worth taking and it is more promising than mega-constitutional change. Besides, it 
would provide an ample ground for civil societies in the country to rise above section al 
and parochial interest to better advocate for reform. 
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